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Various theoretical approaches uphold the relevance of the relationship between the 
form of management and performance. Different management styles influence 
relationships of agency (Jensen, 1998), the cost of governing transactions (Williamson, 
1985) and the allocation of resources between the exploitation and exploration of 
activities (March, 1991), and this is manifested in firm performance. In light of these 
assumptions, this article presents an empirical verification of the relationship between 
the management of franchises and their performance, examining how different styles of 
management on the part of franchisers over their franchisees have significant effects on 
the growth and profits of franchiser firms.  
KEYWORDS: franchises, styles of management, performance, franchiser-franchisee 
relations 
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This article examines how different forms of management of franchises in Spain affect 
their performance. According to data from the Spanish Franchise Association (2009), in 
this country there are currently more than 900 regist red brand names (approximately 
80% of which are national), 70,000 establishments (owned either by the franchiser or 
the franchisee), with a total turnover of more than 25,000 million Euros. 
In this study, the form or style of management, rega ded as one of the fundamental 
explanatory variables in different organizational forms and their success or failure, is 
considered through various perspectives from organizational theory. Among other 
authors, Weick (1979), highlights that there is an ecological selection from the possible 
managerial proposals via the concept of enactment, and the best of these go to make up 
the business world; Child (1972), through the concept of strategic choice, has explicitly 
underlined in the contingent literature the importance (and the freedom) of managers to 
choose the way in which contingency factors are related; and Hambrick (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007) clearly considers thate characteristics of managers 
(experiences, values, and personality) and their interpretation of the firm’s reality, 
constitute the fundamental explanatory variable of firm strategy and performance. 
Along similar lines to the studies cited above and others related to franchises that 
examine the form of management and its relation to performance (Shane, 1996, 2001; 
Combs et al., 2006), this research examines the way in which franchisers in Spain 
combine forms of management or styles of direction that are analogous to the leadership 
types proposed by Liu et al (2003). These forms of management are similar to the 
directive, transactional, transformational or empowering leadership styles, or to a 
mixture of these forms.  
The study is structured as follows: it begins with a review of some of the most relevant 
theoretical and empirical contributions in the literature on franchises. This review 
allows us to relate forms of management, agency issues and firm governance costs with 
performance; or to relate performance with the alloc ti n of resources to the 
exploitation or exploration of new opportunities. The hypotheses of the study are then 
derived from this review. The following section describes the empirical study, in which 
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we verify the extent to which the hypotheses can be confirmed via the corresponding 
regression equations. 
Finally, the conclusions provide additional comment o  the results obtained and show 
that the approach used in this research forms a part of  long tradition that recommends 
mixing the hard or formal parts of the contract (work contracts or cooperation 
agreements) with the softer parts, based on social relationships that increase 
understanding and trust.  
 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
We firstly address the literature on franchises, adding to this literature by providing a 
contribution on the use of resources in exploiting or exploring the activities and forms 
of management or leadership of the franchiser in terms of managing franchised outlets. 
We then go on to formulate the hypotheses of the study, based partly on the ideas 
contained in the theory reviewed herein.  
The study of franchises has been approached from varying perspectives and with 
differing purposes, some of which adopt a theoretical approach that bears close relation 
to the object of the research and others where diffrent perspectives focus on the same 
research topic. In this sense, the institutional approach (Combs, Michael & 
Castrogiovanni, 2009), strategic literature that stresses the need for an adequate fit with 
resources (Gillis & Combs, 2009) or with structure (Yin & Zajac, 2004), the agency 
theory (Shane, 1996; Combs & Ketchen, 1999), the resource-based approach 
(Mitsuhashi et al., 2008) or transaction cost economics (Combs & Ketch n, 1999) 
constitute the main approaches that propose the explanatory variables of franchiser 
firms. 
Other important research relates the survival and failure rate of franchises with 
institutional legitimacy or with the efficiency of the franchise contract (Shane & Foo, 
1999; Shane, 2001); or they explain the franchise within the framework of a strategy for 
attracting partners and increasing in size (Shane, Shankar & Aravindakshan, 2006), 
avoiding a shortage of capital (Combs & Ketchen, 1999), enabling adaptation to local 
tastes (Combs, Ketchen & Ireland, 2006) or entry to other markets or countries (Combs 
& Ketchen, 1999). 
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In franchiser firms, franchising outlets imply a reduction in income on every item sold 
(compared to selling them in their own establishment), which will only be profitable if 
the franchising system allows them to sufficiently increase the number of items sold  
and/or reduce the proportion needed for the governance costs of the sales network. This 
is reliant on the existence of an efficient contract (Shane & Foo, 1999; Shane, 2001). If 
the contract motivates efficient behaviour, a reduction in shirking can be expected from 
the employees at each outlet (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972), along with cooperation 
between franchiser and franchisee in which free-riding or hold-up become less frequent 
(Klein et al., 1978).   
Combs & Castrogiovanni (1994), Combs & Ketchen (1999) and Combs et al. (2006) 
highlight the advantages of the franchise system because of the greater strategic 
flexibility and controllability of this form of organization, which saves on recruiting, 
training and monitoring costs; and because of the advantages and opportunities for 
growth that derive from lesser strain on capital and other resources. Consistent with the 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983a, b), Shane (1996) 
suggests that by substituting managers on the payroll fo  owners of outlets, the problem 
of adverse selection is reduced, along with the subsequent one of moral hazard or 
opportunistic behavior, whilst enabling effective and efficient management.  
However, while shirking in different outlets can be expected to fall off without 
additional costs for the franchiser, by transferring ownership of stores to franchisees, the 
possible problems posed by free-riding or hold-up cannot be solved as simply. The 
central idea to the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1995) that the problem will be 
solved by handing over ownership of the asset cannot fully occur in a franchise system, 
because the franchisee is “renting” the brand name of the franchiser and can indulge in 
free-riding in terms of product quality or customer ca e. By “renting out” the image and 
brand name, along with its procedures, the door is open to hold-up on the part of the 
franchiser by not investing sufficiently in advertising or by neglecting to make 
improvements in the design and content of the product.   
As Williamson (1985: 26) points out, the solution to the problems mentioned above 
imply a total and ex ante alignment of incentives, a situation that normally exceeds the 
capacity of the agents involved (Simon, 1947), and thus the costs (and the incentives) x 
post of an incomplete contract should be considered as an adaptation to the rational 
limitations of the agents involved. Such costs are fundamentally made up of supervisory 
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costs associated with complying with an agreement and its adaptation to unforeseen 
circumstances (Williamson, 1985). This does not diminish efforts ex ante to establish a 
governance structure that correctly guides the behavior of the franchiser and the agents 
or owners of franchised outlets. 
In this sense, the proposal for managing incentives d rived from Williamson (1985: 
135-141) is of particular interest. When applied to a franchiser firm, this proposal 
consists of passing on profits to independent units (outlets) as the alignment ex ante of 
the incentives of their owners (market incentives or high-powered incentives), 
completing the management of outlet owner behavior ia the control ex post of those 
aspects of their business activity that are relevant to the franchiser firm (product quality 
or customer care and services). This control ex post, which relates to incentives that are 
internal to the common governance structure of the franchise, is similar to low-powered 
incentives Williamson suggests for the internal environment of organizations (less 
powerful incentives but which are essential for “completing” the system of incentives). 
At this point, it should be noted that, in the alignment of incentives, there is a h rd part, 
or “technical” part which could be called incentive design and a soft part, which is of a 
social nature and is based upon social acceptance ad institutionalized norms and 
behavior (Orlikowski, 1992; Weick & Roberts, 1993). It could be claimed that no 
system of incentives is complete without the soft part. Jensen (1998) referred to this 
issue when examining quality management systems. Thi  author claims that the best 
process and job designs kindle love for the product amongst workers, which goes 
further than control systems in reducing agency problems.  
We are also interested in discovering whether the franchiser, through the objectives and 
policies transmitted to franchisees, combines policies aimed at business exploitation 
with others aimed at the xploration of improvements in procedures and/or ways of 
attending and adapting to customer needs. In any firm, exploitation and exploration 
compete for the scarce resources and limited capabilities of the organization (March, 
1991), although in the medium or long term, competitiv ness means solving the 
dilemma in a balanced manner (Gupta & Shalley, 2006; Sarkees & Hulland, 2009), 
obtaining productivity from established routines whilst proposing new objectives and 
fostering learning (Winter, 2000, 2003). 
In a first approximation, the franchiser is the one that will devote part of his/her 
investment to exploring new technical, organizational or market possibilities, with 
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exploitation tasks predominating in franchised outlets. However, as suggested by 
Combs et al (2006), this is not always so. The franchisee may h ve greater knowledge 
of local tastes and of how to best interact with customers, a fact that may contribute to 
the success of the franchise and front end learning on the part of the franchiser. 
If the franchise is efficient, there will be a satifactory fit between the form of 
management adopted by the franchiser, the form of governance and the social, 
administrative and technical organization of the franchise (Altinay & Okumus, 2010; 
Crook et al., 2010; Gillis & Castrogiovanni, 2010; Hindle & Moroz, 2010; Sánchez 
Gómez et al., 2010; Sánchez Gómez et al., 2011; Sebora & Theerapatvong, 2010; 
Tihula & Huovinen, 2010; Valliere, 2010; Vázquez, 2009; Wakkee et al., 2010). A 
satisfactory fit implies that, besides using technial tools for control (supervision of 
standard procedures in outlets), social control is enabled by basing it on institutionalized 
norms and behaviour.2 If this occurs, it will enable the control of problems related to 
behavior and incentive alignment that appear in the ag ncy theory (AT) and in 
transaction cost economics (TCE), and could guide the actions of franchise members 
towards a suitable mixture of the exploitation of resources and the exploration of new 
possibilities, as can be drawn from the resource-based pproach (RBV). 
Insert Table1 
Table 1 relates the possible forms of management of franchises to: 1) the effects on the 
form of governance (AT, TCE); 2) orientation towards the exploitation of resources 
and/or the exploration of new combinations of factors (RBV); 3) the alignment of 
incentives and behaviour (AT, TCE); 4) productive or c mmercial efficiency that is 
manifested in routines and capabilities (RBV); and 5) the forms or types of management 
and leadership (Liu et al., 2003) that correspond to each of the forms of management of 
franchises. The forms of management or leadership tat we use in this article 
correspond to the classic forms of directive leadership, transactional leadership, 
transformational leadership and empowering leadership (Liu et al., 2003: 132). 
Liu et al (2003) apply these concepts to internal aspects of the firm, as well as to certain 
characteristics of work, but we clearly give a different use to the forms of management 
or types of leadership and their applications to franchiser-franchisee relations in our 
article. We believe that the way in which we apply them to our research is suitable and 
                                                
2 The social institutionalization referred to here has notable precedents in the work of Barnard (1938), 
Gouldner (1961) and Ouchi (1980), and more recently i  that of Jensen (1998). 
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useful for constructing the article because (1) the different forms of management from 
TCE or from AT look to produce, in franchises, the same effects on workers as the 
types of leadership specified by Liu et al. (2003). (2) The different forms of 
management and leadership proposed by Liu et al (2003) are independent concepts from 
TCE or from AT and this enables their transversal use, covering essential aspects of 
both theories (enabling or hindering commitment andligning incentives ex ante or ex 
post (table 1). (3) The use we make of the different forms of management and 
leadership allows us to relate these to the exploitation and consolidation of routines that 
are already established; or with exploration and the improvement of routines and 
capabilities (RBV).3 
In light of the ideas expressed above, it can be expected that the forms of management 
that improve the problem of agency and reduce franchiser-franchisee costs (enabling the 
involvement of the latter or through the use of contr l mechanisms) will have a positive 
and significant relationship with the performance of the franchiser. The same may also 
be said of the forms of management that enable the exploitation or exploration of the 
activities, or a balance between them. 
The form of management DS1 (rows 1, 2, 4, 14 and 15; table 1), in which shared 
objectives and trust are relevant elements that enabl  the initiatives of subordinates or 
partners to affect performance enabling, above all, the commitment to objectives and the 
alignment ex ante of incentives that will improve agency relations and transaction costs 
between franchiser and franchisee (see table 1). The mixture of items that make up the 
DS1 form of management, as a more advanced form, enabl s the allocation of resources 
to the exploration of new activities or opportunities without this impeding the balance of 
resource allocation towards exploration and exploitati n. Hypothesis H1 formulates this 
idea.   
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Forms of management based on transformational or empowering 
leadership (DS1, table 1) contribute to improving agency relations and transaction costs 
between franchiser and franchisee, and enable the allocation of resources to the 
exploration of activities, and have a positive, significant relation with the performance 
of the franchiser. 
The DS2 form of management (table 1), in which, aside from control, the exchange of 
efforts and rewards between superior and subordinate or between partners is 
fundamental, will affect the performance of the franchiser through greater control over 
the franchisee (ex post alignment of incentives) and through clearer and ueq ivocal 
                                                
3 Although AT, TCE and RBV are frequently cited as alternative approaches in the study of different 
organizational phenomena, in terms of firm performance, they are, in fact, complementary.  
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directives on the established routines that enable the allocation of resources to the 
exploitation of activities. This idea is expressed in hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Forms of management based on directive or transactional leadership 
(DS2, table 1) contribute to improving agency relations and transaction costs between 
franchiser and franchisees and enable the exploitation of resources, and have a positive, 
significant relation with the performance of the franchiser.  
Form of management DS3, in which the exchange of efforts and rewards between 
superior and subordinate or among partners, mixed with shared objectives and a 
convergence of interests is dominant, will affect performance, enabling commitment 
with objectives and ex ante alignment of incentives improving agency relations and 
transaction costs between franchiser and franchisee. The mix of items that make up the 
DS3 form of management enables the balance between exploitation and exploration of 
activities with somewhat greater emphasis on exploitati n. This proposal is formulated 
in hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Forms of management based on transactional or transformational 
leadership (DS3, table 1) contribute to improving agency relations and transaction costs 
between franchiser and franchisees and, with greater mphasis on exploitation, enable a 
balance in resource allocation towards the exploitati n or exploration of activities, and  
have a positive, significant relation with the performance of the franchiser.  
The DS4 form of management (table 1), in which control over the subordinate or over 
the partner plays a fundamental role, will affect performance ensuring the strict 
compliance with norms, and will tend towards the allocation of resources to exploitation 
and a consolidation of established routines. This form of management, although it can 
reduce agency costs of the franchiser with regard to the franchisee, it is difficult to 
reduce transaction costs between the two. Relations based only on control, without other 
elements that orient behaviour to comply with objectiv s, increase the cost of governing 
the relationship or the transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Forms of management based on a strict use of directive leadership 
(DS4, table 1), if the control is efficient, contribute to improving agency relations and 
will enable the allocation of resources of the franchisee to exploitation, and have a 
positive, significant relation with the performance of the franchiser.   
The different managerial franchiser styles (table 1), and the results in terms of 
performance, should confirm the proposed hypotheses.  
 
Methodology and empirical results 
We go on to describe the design of the empirical investigation, the methodology used 
and the verification of the hypotheses.  
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The reference population, 1026 franchises was taken from the quefranquicias web page 
in the year 2006, and questionnaires were sent to the managers of the franchiser firms, 
obtaining 103 replies, of which 7 were discarded due to bring incomplete.4  The 
maximum sample error for the 96 firms is thus 9.53%, with a confidence level of 95% 
at worst (dichotomous questions in which p = q = 50%). Questions on the form of 
management (or styles of leadership) of the franchiser were addressed to 192 franchised 
firms (small businesses), two for each franchiser firm, chosen from Spanish territory, 
which employed the most qualified managers. In thissecond case, both the reference 
population and the sample were duplicated, and thus the ample error is the same. Table 
2 shows the sectors of activity of the franchiser firms and the percentages they present 
in the sample.  
Insert Table 2 
The Chi2 test (p-value 0.991) indicates that the proportion of firms by sector of activity 
is homogenous throughout the 12 sectors.  All sectors have the same relative weighting 
for the analysis carried out.  
The questions addressed to the managers of the franchiser firms, using 5-point Likert 
scales were as follows: performance of the firm, importance attributed to the 
environment for firm performance, the dynamic nature of the environment, and 
complexity of the environment. Secondly, the dichotomous questions posed were: do 
you own outlets in Spain?, do you charge royalties?, do you invest in advertising?, does 
the franchisee make an initial payment to the franchiser?, in which year did the firm 
begin franchising? (Regression models 1 and 2, tables 3 and 4).  
The construct performance of the firm was obtained via questions on the levels of 
importance and levels of satisfaction of performance indicators and by then multiplying 
the values obtained for importance by the values obtained for satisfaction i each item. 
The items related to performance are growth in sales, return on investment (ROI), 
return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), growth in market share and net profit 
(see Appendix).  
Lastly, the questions posed to franchised outlets, via five-point Likert scales, appear in 
the left-hand column in table 1.  
                                                
4 The web page www.quefranquicia.com used for obtaining the population of franchises in this study is 
owned by the consultants Barbadillo Asociados (www.bya com) and is the most complete franchise 
directory in Spain with access to over 1000 franchises. 
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Validity and reliability of the scales   
With regard to the validity of the scales, the scale that most needs to be founded on the 
literature is the scale that corresponds to the forms of management and leadership on the 
part of franchisers in their management of franchisees, which forms the basis of this 
study. The fundamental supposition in this research is that the different forms of 
franchise management will have repercussions on the be avior of franchisees and on 
performance (growth and profits) of the franchiser firm.  
Rows 1-2, 4, and 14-15, in the first column of table 1 indicate a directive style (DS), in 
accordance with transformational or empowering leadership. Transformational 
leadership involves incentives that transcend self-interest in order to achieve a collective 
purpose (vision or mission) in the long-term, fostering trust and commitment (Liu et al., 
2003: 133). When applied to franchises, this means that the form of management of the 
franchise has brought about feelings of love for the product or the service in franchisees 
(Jensen, 1998), thereby reducing the problems of agency. This makes the relationships 
between franchisers and franchisees correspond to what Williamson (1985) called 
fundamental transformation, in which relationships reach a specific value through 
mutual knowledge and the relationships of trust established, thus bringing down the 
governance costs of transactions. 
Within this framework, one can expect more emphasis on the exploration of new 
possibilities, which are not contradictory to a possible balanced use of resources 
between exploitation or exploration. With respect to empowering leadership, which 
goes a step further by highlighting self-control and participation in building the firm in 
the long-term, it does not add any substantial variations to our research in terms of 
transformational leadership. In the left-hand margin, table 1 denotes the rows 
concerning transformational or empowering leadership with the label DS1 (directive 
style or leadership style 1). 
Rows 7-9, in the first column of table 1, indicate a form of management that comes 
somewhere between directive and transactional leadership (DS2). Directive leadership 
acts on accommodating or submissive subordinates who accept the form of management, 
objectives assigned to the firm and the sanctions in place in the case of non-compliance. 
Transactional leadership is based on exchanges and agreements between the leader and 
 11
his/her followers, and stresses an appropriate set of conomic and social rewards that 
depend on attaining objectives. Control in complying with objectives and their link to 
the level of applying rewards and sanctions is the common characteristic of these two 
forms of leadership. This form of management entails greater emphasis on the 
exploitation of activities.  
In the case of franchises, this means that the form f anagement of franchisees is 
based upon explicit incentives, control, and complying with clauses in the contract, and 
is thus closely related to the agency theory in terms of control (Fama & Jensen, 1983a, b) 
and the explicit management (or design) of incentivs (Jensen, 1998), along with 
transaction cost economics with regard to the formalization of contracts and their 
fulfilment (Williamson, 1993). This is another path towards the reduction of problems 
of agency and towards cutting down on the governance cost of transactions.  
Rows 3, 5 and 10-12 of the first column in table 1 indicate a form of management that 
moves between transactional or transformational leadership (DS3). The allocation of 
resources to the exploitation of activities carries greater weight in this form of 
management, without hindering sufficient levels of balance in allocating resources to 
exploitation and exploration.  
Finally, rows 6 and 13 of the first column of table 1 indicate a form of management that 
emphasizes the procedures and objectives assigned and the sanctions in the case of non-
compliance, representing a strict use of directive leadership (DS4). This form of 
management can reduce the problems of agency if control is effective, but does not 
guide relationships that improve the overall transaction costs. The emphasis on 
procedures and objectives established entails the allocation of resources to exploitation.  
With regard to the reliability of the scales, in order to analyze internal consistency, we 
used the Cronbach alpha statistic, whose optimum values are greater than or equal to  
0.7 (Nunnally, 1978), although values greater than 0.6 are acceptable in research of an 
exploratory nature (Hair et al., 1999). 
The Cronbach alpha values that correspond to the different constructs in the study are 
as follows: importance of the firm’s performance objectives (0.658), satisfaction with 
the firm’s performance (0.699), types of management or leadership on the part of the 
franchiser in managing franchises (0.709), importance of the environment (0.613), 
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dynamic nature of the environment (0.672) and complexity of the environment (0.729). 
The remaining concepts researched correspond to dich tomous questions.  
 
Factor analysis  
Once the validity of the constructs in the most relevant case of forms of management 
has been established (table 1), and having verified th  fulfilment of the conditions of 
reliability, we carry out a factor analysis for each construct. Grouping variables in this 
way allows us to deal with manageable relationships between the forms of management 
and firm performance, besides obtaining simpler expressions of the importance of the 
environment and its complexity. 
With regard to firm performance, the factor analysis (Principal Component Analysis) 
groups the six variables into two factors: growth (in sales and market share) and 
financial results (ROI, ROE, ROS and net profit). In this factor analysis, the KMO 
(Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) is 0.773; and the Bartlett sphericity test corresponds to the 
approximate chi-square 120,912, df 15, and Sig. 0.000 (regression models 1 and 2, 
tables 3 and 4).  
In the forms of management or leadership of the franchiser, the factor analysis groups 
the variables into factors F1-F5 (Fi, left-hand margin, table 1) with certain d screpancies 
with regard to the forms or styles of management initially proposed (DSi, left-hand 
margin, table 1). However, this does not substantially modify the existence of a relevant, 
significant relationship between the form of management and the performance obtained, 
in accordance with the basic assumption of the article. The KMO here is 0.737; and the 
Bartlett sphericity test shows an approximate chi-square value of 645,851, df 105, and 
Sig. 0.000.  
The first discrepancy occurs in directive style 1 (DS1, table 1). The factor analysis 
introduces variable 11 into this form of management and removes variable 4 (factor F1, 
table 1), but this form of management clearly constitutes transformational leadership, in 
accordance with our initial proposal. Between DS2 and the variables grouped by factor 
5 (F5, table 1), the coincidence is total; and in the same way, the DS4 proposed 
coincides with factor F4. The greatest discrepancy o curs in DS3. From the initial 
proposal on this form or style of management, plus variable 4 previously removed from 
DS1, the factor analysis forms two groups of variables: variables 4 and 5, which 
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correspond to factor F3, and the variables 3, 10 and 12, which correspond to the new 
factor  F2 (matrix of rotated components in Appendix, table 5). 
Factor F3, which has a significant relationship with performance (regression model 2, 
table 4), maintains the directive style initially pro osed (DS3), with a certain tendency 
towards empowering leadership (variable 4), which favours allocating resources to the 
exploration of opportunities, within the necessary equilibrium with exploitation, enabled 
by the training offered by the franchiser. Factor F2, despite being made up of similar 
items to those in F3, is not significant (regression model 2, table 4). 
With regard to the control variables, the control variable importance of the environment 
is grouped into two components; importance 1 (competitive, consumer and 
technological environment) and importance 2 (economic and socio-cultural 
environment). Here, the regulatory environment variable has been removed to obtain a 
better KMO. We thus obtain a KMO of 0.649; and the Bartlett sphericity test shows an 
approximate chi-square of 44.692, df 10, and Sig. 0.00 .  
The control variable dynamic nature of the environment has a single main component 
that groups changes into the competitive, consumer, t chnological, regulatory, 
economic and socio-cultural environment, with a KMO of 0.691; the Bartlett sphericity 
test shows an approximate chi-square of  76.659, df 15, and Sig. 0.000.  
The control variable complexity of the environment is grouped into two components; 
complexity 1 (technological, regulatory, economic and socio-cultura  environment) and 
complexity 2 (competitive and consumer environment), with a KMO of 0.679; and the 
Bartlett sphericity test has an approximate chi-square 127.975, df 15, and Sig. 0.000.  
The remaining control variables are dichotomous and re presented directly in 
regression models 1 and 2 (tables 3 and 4).  
 
Verification of the hypotheses and discussion of the results  
Regression models 1 and 2 are shown in tables 3 and 4. The first of these relates the 
control variables with performance and the second icorporates the forms of 
management or leadership, thus forming the complete model. 
Insert Table 3 
Insert Table 4 
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With regard to regression model 2, or the complete model, the regression equation 
obtained from the growth of the franchiser firm (growth in sales and/or market share) 
corresponds to management or leadership styles F1 and F3 (table 1), to the dynamic 
nature of the environment (DYN), royalties (ROY) and the upfront franchise fee (UFF): 
GROWTH OF THE FRANCHISER FIRM = 0.321*** (F1) + 0.205** (F3) + 0.280** 
(DYN) + 0.461*** (ROY) – 0.228* (UFF).   
The β coefficient of DS1 in its F1 form (0,321***), which is positive and significant, 
confirms hypothesis 1 (H1). This form of managing franchisees through supporting 
their initiatives, improving management and treating them in a way that increases trust 
on both sides fosters commitment to the franchise, diminishes problems of agency and 
reduces the cost of governing transactions; all of which, together with the allocation of 
resources to exploration, is manifested in improved  performance.  
The β coefficient of DS3 in its new F3 form (0.205**), which is positive and significant, 
partially confirms hypothesis 3 (H3). This form of management of franchisees provides 
stimuli and information so that outlets can explore new possibilities and better exploit 
activities. Regrouping items from DS3 to F3 adds empowering leadership to the mixture 
of transactional and transformational leadership, which reinforces the balance of the 
allocation of resources to exploitation and explorati n, reducing the greater emphasis on 
exploitation.  
In terms of the control variables, the β coefficient of DYN (0.280**), which is positive 
and significant, probably shows that the dynamic enviro ment provides greater 
opportunities for the growth of the firm, although the focus of this study does not allow 
us to research this question.  
The β coefficient corresponding to ROY (0.461***), which is positive, significant and 
strongly correlated to growth, appears to be an important control variable in explaining 
the growth of the franchiser.  Charging royalties is an important source of income for 
financing all kinds of policies, among which is the exploration of opportunities.  
Finally, the existence of UFF (– 0.228*), which is negative and significant, indicates 
that the initial payment hinders growth due to the incorporation of new franchisees.5  
                                                
5 These last two results on control variables, however, proposed as hypotheses in the meta analysis of 
Combs and Ketchen (2003), are not corroborated in this analysis. 
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Turning now to the regression equation obtained with regard to the different measures 
of financial performance of franchiser firms (ROI, ROE, ROS, net profit), this equation 
corresponds to the constant 0.361***, styles of management or leadership F1 and F5, 
importance 1 of the environment (IME1), the dynamic nature (DYN) and royalties 
(ROY): 
INCOME-PROFITS  OF  THE  FRANCHISER  FIRM  =  0.361***  +  0.245** (F1) + 
+ 0.281*** (F5) + 0.189* (IME1)  +  0.229*  (DYN) + 0.284* (ROY). 
The β coefficient of DS1 in its F1 form (0.245**), which is positive and significant, 
supports hypothesis 1 (H1) for the same reasons put forward for the previous regression 
equation. This form of managing franchisees reduces problems of agency, cuts the cost 
of governing transactions and enables the allocation of resources to exploration, and is 
thus positively relate to performance. 
The β coefficient of F5 (0.281***), which is positive and significant (and incorporates 
the initial proposal of directive style DS2), confirms hypothesis 2 (H2) for opposite and 
complementary reasons to those of directive style 1. This form of management, aside 
from the exchange of efforts and rewards, demands strict compliance with all 
procedures of production and commercialization, along with all actions that affect the 
image of the brand name, through inspections and formal control.  Control dominates 
this form of governance aimed at consolidating existing routines and exploiting 
resources. If there is a correct exchange of efforts and rewards, and control is effective 
and efficient, this can all contribute to curtailing problems of agency and to reducing the 
governance costs associated with transactions.   
The β coefficient of IME1 (0.189*), which is positive and significant, indicates that the 
franchiser believes that he/she depends particularly on the competitive, consumer and 
technological environment. 
The β coefficient of DYN (0.229*), which is positive and significant, shows that the 
dynamic nature of the environment favours income and profits for the firm, just as it 
favours growth, as we saw in the previous regression equation. An examination of the 
correlations between different constructs (Appendix, table 6) shows a positive and 
significant (bilateral) correlation of 0.256 between DYN and F5, which may be 
interpreted in the sense that, as far as income and profits are concerned, franchiser firms 
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face up to the dynamic nature of the environment by intensifying their own routines and 
ensuring the fulfilment of procedures that guarantee the efficiency of the exploitation of 
resources.  
The β coefficient of the ROY (0.284*), which is positive and significant, indicates, as 
expected, that royalties contribute to the income and profits of franchiser firms.  
Finally, the constant 0.361*** indicates that there ar  elements or causes for the income 
and profit in franchises that are not explained by the regression model. 
Style of Management DS4, which corresponds to factor F4, is not significant in any of 
the regression equations. Therefore, hypothesis 4 (H4), which proposes a positive, 
significant relation between DS4 (strict control) and the franchising firm’s performance 
is not confirmed. 
Conclusions 
The overall conclusion of this study is that the performance of franchiser firms (growth, 
income and profits) corresponds to the formulae: 
(1) GROWTH = β1 (F1) + β2 (F3) + β3 (DYN) + β4 (ROY) – β5 (UFF).  
(2) INCOME-PROFITS = α + γ1 (F1) + γ2 (F5) + γ3 (IME1) + γ4 (DYN) + γ5 (ROY). 
 Performance should not be expressed by just one formula, because growth and the 
different expressions of income and profit can move in opposite directions.  
Observation of the equations (1) and (2) in regression model 2 shows that the form of 
management or leadership style 1 (DS1 in its F1 form) has a positive and significant 
coefficient both in terms of growth of the franchiser firm and with regard to profits. 
Management of franchisees characterized by fair treatm nt, support for initiatives and 
improvement in management conditions (see table 1) will increase trust between the 
two parties, encouraging commitment to the franchise, reducing problems of agency and 
cutting the governance costs of transactions, all of which, in addition to the allocation of 
resources to exploration, supports hypothesis 1.  
Secondly, the form of management or leadership style 3 (DS3 in its F3 form) has a 
positive and significant coefficient in the equation (1) that corresponds to growth of the 
franchiser. It is a form of management (table 1) that encourages the franchisee to 
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address problems in a new way, proposing variations n the practices of the franchise 
(exploration), and facilities are given for improvem nt in their training and those of 
employees (exploitation).  If this form of management nables a balanced use of 
resources between exploitation and exploration, in a framework that enables 
commitment between franchiser and franchisees, this favours the performance of the 
franchiser firm, as the regression coefficient indicates,. Hypothesis 3 (H3) is confirmed 
only partially, because of the change of items betwe n DS1 and F1. 
Thirdly, the form of management or style of leadership 5 (F5), which corresponds to the 
previous directive style DS2 (table 1), has a positive and significant coefficient for the 
equation (2) that corresponds to the income and profits of the franchiser. It is a form of 
management that emphasizes the demand for strict compliance of the procedures and 
actions that the franchisee must observe, establishing forms of inspection and control 
that, if they are effective, as the regression coeffici nt indicates, reduces problems of 
agency and cuts the governance costs associated with transactions. Moreover, this form 
of management consolidates established routines and gui es resources towards 
exploitation, contributing to the fulfilment of hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4), which proposes a positive, significant relation between DS4 (strict 
control) and the franchising firm’s performance is not confirmed. The DS4 form of 
management, which corresponds precisely to factor F4 (table 1), is not significant in 
either of the two regression equations.  
In addition, observation of the control variables allows us to identify more stability in 
profits than in growth. In the equation (1) concerning growth in sales and/or market 
share, the relationships with the dynamic nature of the environment or with charging 
royalties are significant to a level of 95% and 99% respectively, while in the equation (2) 
that corresponds to income and profits, those same ite s are only significant to 90%.  
Finally, and on a more general note, this article att mpts to contribute to research that 
relates the forms of management of franchises with performance. Scott Shane has 
addressed this question via the agency theory (1996) and the existence of efficient 
contracts (2001), and in the latter study highlights t e fact that “many of the dimensions 
of efficient contracting on which firms are selected for survival are not hard contracting 
dimensions, but are dimensions of s cial control” (p. 136). 
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This mix of hard or formal parts in the contract, which demand strict compliance of the 
stipulated agreements and procedures, and soft parts b sed on social relationships that 
increase understanding and trust between the parties, is the aspect we have attempted to 
explore with our approach to different forms of management or styles of leadership in 
table 1. We are thus applying a long tradition of schools of organizational thought on 
contracts to forms of governance. From the fields of ociology or economy, the search 
for a balance between the hard and soft parts of the contract have appeared in studies 
such as those of Barnard (1938), Gouldner (1961), Ouchi (1980) or Tsui et al (1997); 
and, although these authors refer fundamentally to in ernal contracts between the 
business owner and employees, this line of thought can be extended to any type of 





1. Return on Assets (ROA) or Return on Investment (ROI) tells an investor how much 
profit a company generates for each $1 in assets. In his question, they were asked to 
provide information on the profit obtained in the last year before taxes. 
ROA = Net Profit Margin x Asset Turnover 
2. Return on Equity (ROE) measures the rate of return on the ownership interest 
(shareholders’ equity) of the common stock owners.  
ROE = Net income after tax / Shareholder Equity 
3. Operating Margin or Return on Sales is a measurement of what proportion of a 
company’s revenue is left over, before taxes and other indirect costs and after 
paying for variable costs of production. 
ROS = Operating Income / Net Operating Revenues  
Insert Table 5 
Insert Table 6 
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Table 1. Forms of management adopted by franchisers, basic theories and types of 
leadership    
 
 Forms of 
management  in 
franchises 
(question posed to 
franchised). 
Social effects/ 

















clearly relays the 
objectives of the 
franchise with 
regard to products 
or services. 
Contributes to 

























characteristics of the 
environment as 
opportunities, in the 
framework of the 
franchise business 
practices. 
Improves the agency 









capabilities of  
the franchise. 













makes me aware of 
aspects in the 
industrial sector that 
I had not previously 
considered. 
Improves the agency 
rel. and transactions. 
Exploitation/explora-

















encourages me to 
Improves the agency 
rel. and transactions. 
Enables 
commitment, 
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a novel way by 
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provides chances for 
improving my 
training and that of 
my employees in 
production or 
customer care. 
Improves the agency 






















makes me not trust 
in receiving 
leniency if there are 
involuntary errors in 
procedures. 

























inspections and if 
established practices 
are not followed 
may not renew 
franchise contract. 






















compliance of all 
actions that 
contribute to the 
image of the brand 
























compliance of all 
procedures related 
to the product or 
service. 























makes me rethink 
my productive 
activity in ways I 
had not previously 
considered. 
Improves the agency 
rel. and transactions. 
Exploitation/explora-























that allows for 
appropriate 
management of the 
employees in 
franchised outlets. 
Improves the agency 
























informs me on 
aspects of my 
commercial activity 
or on my customers 
that I had not 
previously 
considered. 
Improves the agency 
and transactions rel. 
Exploitation/explora-






routines of the 
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The franchiser bears 
in mind the needs 
and interests of 
franchisees. 
Contributes to 





































































% of the N in 
the table  
Dietary products, drugstores, chemists, opticians, co metics 9 9.47% 
Hotels and restaurants 10 10.5% 
Commercialization and distribution of products or se vices 10 10.5% 
Clothes, manufacturing, fashion and accessories 8 8.4% 
Information technology, telecommunications 9 9.47% 
Travel agencies, leisure 8 8.4% 
Estate agents 7 7.37% 
Food suppliers, Bakers, confectioners, ice cream parlors 7 7.37% 
Construction, decoration, furniture, interior restora ion 8 8.4% 
Printing, stationers, office materials, sign making  7 7.37% 
Automobile industry 6 6.3% 























                                                









Constant 0.053 0.434*** 
Importance of the environment 1 0.172 0.149 
Importance of the environment 2 -0.022 0.188* 
Dynamic nature of the environment 0.301** 0.321** 
Complexity of the environment 1 0.033 -0.059 
Complexity of the environment 2 -0.079 -0.060 
Franchiser: businesses in Spain? -0.034 -0.012 
Does the franchiser charge royalties? 0.347*** 0.156 
Does the franchiser invest in advertising? 0.007 0.001 
Franchisee: Is an initial payment made? -0.119 -0.057 
Year in which the firm became franchise 0.000 -0.034 
R2 0.242 0.208 
Corrected R2  0.149 0.110 
Durbin - Watson 1.234 0.383 
Snedecor F 2.591 2.128 
Significativity F 0.009 0.031 


























Constant -0.234 0.361*** 
Form of management or leadership 1 0.321*** 0.245** 
Form of management or leadership 2 -0.120 -0.158 
Form of management or leadership 3 0.205** 0.161 
Form of management or leadership 4 0.107 -0.053 
Form of management or leadership 5 0.162 0.281*** 
Importance of the environment 1 0.175 0.189* 
Importance of the environment 2 -0.101 0.165 
Dynamic nature of the environment 0.280** 0.229* 
Complexity of the environment 1 0.104 -0.031 
Complexity of the environment 2 -0.055 -0.027 
Franchiser: businesses in Spain? 0.143 0.130 
Does the franchiser charge royalties? 0.461*** 0.284* 
Does the franchiser invest in advertising? -0.082 -0.111 
Franchisee: Is an initial payment made? -0.228* -0.147 
Year in which the firm became franchise -0.051 -0.052 
R2 0.400 0.347 
Corrected R2  0.279 0.215 
Durbin - Watson 1.361 0.620 
Snedecor F 3.292 2.623 
Importance of the environment 1 0.000 0.003 










Table 5. Matrix of rotated components of directive styles 
  
Encourages consideration of the 
characteristics of the environment as 
opportunities within the framework of 
business practices. 
.788 .007 -.007 .225 -.137 
Clearly communicates the objectives of 
the franchise with regard to products and 
services.  
.723 .262 -.112 -.056 .136 
Enables conditions that allow employees 
of franchised outlets to be correctly 
managed.  
.794 .092 -.009 .124 .001 
Congratulates franchises that have 
excellent performance.  
.658 .103 .170 -.229 .184 
Bears in mind the needs and interests of 
the franchisees.  
.508 .368 .170 -.016 -.038 
Makes me rethink things about my 
productive or commercial activity I had 
not previously considered.  
.265 .730 .023 -.107 .119 
Informs me about aspects of my 
commercial activity or those of my 
customers that I had not previously 
considered.  
.063 .821 .130 .150 -.056 
Makes me aware of aspects concerning 
the industrial sector that I had not 
previously considered.  
.226 .499 .329 .422 -.213 
Encourages me to address problems in a 
new way, proposing variations in the 
practices of the franchise.  
-.017 .181 .810 .068 .035 
Enables me to improve my training and 
that of my staff in production and 
customer care.  
.037 .056 .749 .248 .071 
 33
Makes me aware of how to avoid 
possible sanctions.  
.007 .017 .240 .761 .032 
Makes me not count on lenience if there 
are involuntary errors in procedures.  
.016 .057 .029 .746 .239 
Demands strict compliance of all actions 
that contribute to the image of the brand 
name.  
-.382 .007 -.300 .062 .597 
Carries out inspections and if established 
procedures are not adhered to the 
franchise contract may not be renewed.  
.075 .007 .069 .257 .692 
Demands strict compliance of all 
procedures related to the product or 
service.  


































Table 6. Correlations between constructs 
  Dynamism  STYLE 1 STYLE 3 STYLE 5 
 Pearson correlation  1 -.164 -.053 .256* 
Dynamism Sig. (bilateral)  .116 .614 .013 
 N 96 93 93 93 
 Pearson correlation -.164 1 .000 .000 
STYLE 1 Sig. (bilateral) .116  1.000 1.000 
 N 93 188 188 188 
 Pearson correlation -.053 .000 1 .000 
STYLE 3 Sig. (bilateral) .614 1.000  1.000 
 N 93 188 188 188 
 Pearson correlation .256* .000 .000 1 
STYLE 5 Sig. (bilateral) .013 1.000 1.000  
 N 93 188 188 188 
*The correlation is significant at a level of 0.05 (bilateral) 
 
 
 
 
